Melissus of Samos was in his prime about 440 B.C. He wrote a treatise On Being, in defence of Parmenides’ theory. 1. That which was, was always and always will be. For if it had come into being, it necessarily follows that before it came into being, Nothing existed. If however Nothing existed, in no way could anything come into being out of nothing. 2. Since therefore it did not come into being, it Is and always was and always will be, and has no beginning or end, but it is eternal. For if it had come into being, it would have a beginning (for it would have come into being at some time, and so begun), and an end (for since it had come into being, it would have ended). But since it has neither begun nor ended, it always was and always will be and has no beginning nor end. For it is impossible for anything to Be, unless it Is completely. 3. But as it Is always, so also its size must always be infinite. 4. Nothing that has a beginning and an end is either everlasting or infinite. S. If it were not One, it will form a boundary in relation to something else. 6. If it were infinite, it would be One; for if it were two, (these) could not be (spatially) infinite, but each would have boundaries in relation to each other. 7. (1) Thus therefore it is everlasting and unlimited and one and like throughout (homogeneous). (2) And neither could it perish or become larger or change its (inner) arrangement, nor does it feel pain or grief. For if it suffered any of these things, it would no longer be One. For if Being alters, it follows that it is not the same, but that that which previously Was is destroyed, and that Not-Being has come into being. Hence if it were to become different by a single hair in ten thousand years, so it must be utterly destroyed in the whole of time. (3) But it is not possible for it to be rearranged either, for the previous arrangement is not destroyed, nor does a nonexistent arrangement come into being. And since it is neither increased by any addition, nor destroyed, nor changed, how (4) So these statements are not consistent with one another. For although we say that there are many things, everlasting(?), having forms and strength, it seems to us that they all alter and change from what is seen on each occasion. (5) It is clear therefore that we have not been seeing correctly, and that those things do not correctly seem to us to be Many; for they would not change if they were real, but each would Be as it seemed to be. For nothing is stronger than that which is real. (6) And if it changed, Being would have been destroyed, and Not-Being would have come into being. Thus, therefore, if Things are Many, they must be such as the One is. 9. If therefore Being Is, it must be One; and if it is One, it is bound not to have body. But if it had Bulk, it would have parts, and would no longer Be. 10. If Being is divided, it moves; and if it moved, it could not Be. Spurious 11. What came into being Is now and always will be. 12. (Graeco-Syrian collection of 'Sayings of the Philosophers'.) Melissus has said: 'I am very angry about the useless work at which the living toil and weary themselves: nocturnal voyages and wearisome wanderings, in which they sail amid the tumultuous waves of the sea, and hover meanwhile constantly between death and life, and tarry abroad, far distant from their homes, only to collect gain, about which they do not know who will inherit it at their death; and they do not wish to acquire the glorious treasures of wisdom, in which they will not be disappointed, because this, while they leave it behind as a
50:1 ὁμουρέων; also ὁμοῦ ῥέων ('changing with the finger').