Gorgias of Leontîni: latter half of fifth century B.C.
He wrote one of the earliest Handbooks on Rhetoric; an essay On Being or On Nature; and a number of model orations, of which parts have survived: from the Olympian Oration, the Encomium on Helen, and the Defence of Palamêdês.
1. (Isocrates: Gorgias had the hardihood to say that nothing whatever exists).
3. (Sextus, from 'On Being' or 'On Nature'):
(b) Being does not exist.
ii. as created.
iii. as both.
iv. as One.
v. as Many.
(c) A mixture of Being and Not-Being does not exist.
II. If anything exists, it is incomprehensible.
III. If it is comprehensible, it is incommunicable.
I. Nothing exists.
If anything exists, it must be either Being or Not-Being, or both Being and Not-Being.
(b) It cannot be Being, for Being does not exist. If Being exists, it must be either everlasting, or created, or both.
ii. Similarly, Being cannot be created; if it were, it must come from something, either Being or Not-Being, both of which are impossible.
iii. Similarly, Being cannot be both everlasting and created, since they are opposite. Therefore Being does not exist.
iv. Being cannot be One, because if it exists it has size, and is therefore infinitely divisible; at least it is threefold, having length, breadth and depth.
v. It cannot be Many, because the Many is made up of an addition of Ones, so that since the One does not exist, the Many do not exist either.
(c) A mixture of Being and Not-Being is impossible. Therefore since Being does not exist, nothing exists.
If the concepts of the mind are not realities, reality cannot be thought: if the thing thought is white, then white is thought about; if the thing thought is non-existent, then non-existence is thought about; this is equivalent to saying that 'existence, reality, is not thought about, cannot be thought'. Many things thought about are not realities: we can conceive of a chariot running on the sea, or a winged man. Also, since things seen are the objects of sight, and things heard are the objects of hearing, and we accept as real things seen without their being heard, and vice versa; so we would have to accept things thought without their being seen or heard; but this would mean believing in things like the chariot racing on the sea.
Therefore reality is not the object of thought, and cannot be comprehended by it. Pure mind, as opposed to sense-perception, or even as an equally valid criterion, is a myth.
III. If anything is comprehensible, it is incommunicable.
The things which exist are perceptibles; the objects of sight are apprehended by sight, the objects of hearing by hearing, and there is no interchange; so that these sense-perceptions cannot communicate with one another. Further, that with which we communicate is speech, and speech is not the same thing as the things that exist, the perceptibles; so that we communicate not the things which exist, but only speech; just as that which is seen cannot become that which is heard, so our speech cannot be equated with that which exists, since it is outside us. Further, speech is composed from the percepts which we receive from without, that is, from perceptibles; so that it is not speech which communicates perceptibles, but perceptibles which create speech. Further, speech can never exactly represent perceptibles, since it is different from them, and perceptibles are apprehended each by the one kind of organ, speech by another. Hence, since the objects of sight cannot be presented to any other organ but sight, and the different sense-organs cannot give their information to one another, similarly speech cannot give any information about perceptibles.
Therefore, if anything exists and is comprehended, it is incommunicable.
4. (Plato in the 'Meno', 76A sqq.: colour is an effluence from objects, fitting the passages of the eyes).
5. (Explanation of the power of the burning-glass): The fire goes out through the pores.
5a. (From the 'Funeral Oration'. Extravagant expressions):
Vultures, living tombs.
5b. (From the 'Funeral Oration'). Trophies (victories) against
(1) This trial is concerned not with death, which comes to all, but with honour: whether I am to die justly or unjustly, under a load of disgrace.
(2) You have the power to decide the issue; you can kill me easily if you wish, whereas I am powerless.
(3) If the accuser Odysseus were bringing the charge because he knew or believed me to be betraying Greece to the barbarians, he would be the best of men, as ensuring the safety of his country, his parents and all Greece, as well as the punishment of the traitor; but if he has concocted this charge through malice, he is equally the worst of men.
(4) Where shall I begin my defence? A cause unsupported by proof engenders fear, and fear makes speech difficult, unless truth and necessity instruct me—teachers more productive of risk than of the means of help.
(s) The accuser cannot know for certain that I committed the crime, because I know for certain that I did not. But if he is acting on conjecture, I can prove in two ways that he is wrong.
(6) First, I cannot have committed the crime. Treasonable action must begin with discussion; but discussion implies a meeting, which was impossible since no one could come to me and I could not go to anyone, nor could a written message be sent.
(7) Nor was direct communication possible between myself, a Greek, and the enemy, a barbarian, since we did not understand each other's language, and an interpreter would have meant having an accomplice.
(8) But even supposing communication could have been arranged, it would have been necessary to exchange pledges, such as hostages (which was impossible),
(9) or perhaps money. A small sum would not have sufficed in such a great undertaking; a large sum could not have been transported without the help of many confederates.
(10) Conveyance of money would have been impossible at night because of the guards, and by daylight because all could see. Nor could I have gone out, or the enemy have come into the camp. Nor could I have concealed any money received.
20. Cimon acquired money in order to use it, and used it to acquire honour.
21. A friend will expect his friend to do only just actions in helping him; but he himself will serve his friend with many actions that belong to the category of unjust also.
22. Not the looks of a woman, but her good reputation should be known to many.
23. Tragedy, by means of legends and emotions, creates a deception in which the deceiver is more honest than the non-deceiver, and the deceived is wiser than the non-deceived.
24. (The 'Seven against Thebes' of Aeschylus): Full of Ares.
25. (Homer's descent traced to Musaeus).
128:1 444-441 B.C. 130:1 πλίγμα 'hold in wrestling', emendation of Diels from MSS. αἴνιγμα, 'riddle'. 134:1 This speech has at first sight little philosophical interest; but its influence on forensic oratory, and therefore doubtless on education, cannot be over-estimated.