40. And as the carpenter, in double fashion.
That the embodied Self is an agent, has been proved by the reasons set forth in Sûtra 33, &c. We now have to consider whether this agency depends on the fundamental nature of the Self, or is due to its limiting adjuncts.--If here it be maintained that for the same reasons which were employed to prove the Self's being an agent its agency must be held to be natural, there being no reasons to the contrary, we reply as follows.
1.--Nor can it be said that release will be obtained through the means effecting it being employed, because whatever depends on means to be employed is non-eternal. Scripture moreover declares that release results from the instruction about the eternally pure, intelligent, free Self. Now instruction of this nature would not be possible, if the agentship of the Self formed part of its nature. The agentship of the Self is therefore due to the attributes of its adjuncts being ascribed to it, and does not form part of its nature. Hence scripture says of the Self, 'As if thinking, as if moving' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7), and 'He (the Self) when in union with the body, the senses, and the mind, is called the enjoyer by wise people' (Ka. Up. I. 3, 4); which passages show that the Self passes into the special condition of being an enjoyer, &c., only through its
1, to refer to an agentship already established elsewhere, and being the product of Nescience.
The preceding remarks refute also the reasons founded on 'the wandering about' and the 'taking' (Sûtras 34, 35), as the statements about them also are mere anuvâdas.--But an objection may be raised, the passage which teaches that the soul while its instruments are asleep, 'moves about,
1. Another scriptural passage also avers that that sacrifice is accomplished by means of speech and buddhi, 'The sacrifice is what results from speech and mind.' Nor can it rightly be maintained (cp. Sûtra 38) that to view the instruments as agents would lead to an exchange of power on the part of the buddhi; for all instruments must necessarily be considered as agents in regard of their special functions 2. But with reference to perception (upalabdhi) those instruments are (not agents, but) mere instruments, and perception belongs to the Self. Nor can agentship be ascribed to the Self on account of perception, since permanent perception constitutes its nature (and hence cannot be viewed as a mere transitory activity). Nor can the agentship which has self-consciousness for its antecedent belong to the perceiving principle (upalabdhri); for self-consciousness itself is an object of perception (on the part of the upalabdhri, i.e. the pure, isolated, intelligent Self). And on this doctrine there is no occasion for assuming a further instrument, as we maintain the buddhi itself to be the instrument.
The objection founded on the impossibility of meditation (Sûtra 39) is already refuted by the fact, pointed out above, of scripture having a purport, meditation being enjoined by scripture with reference to such agentship as is already established by other passages.--The result of all this is
Footnotes
53:1 Kartritvasya dharmâdîni nimittâni teshâm gñânânivartyatve muktâv api sambhavât kartritvam syât gñânena tannivrittau teshâm agñânakâryatvât kritam kartritvam api tathâ syât, saktes ka sakta-sakyasâpekshatayâ sanimittakriyâlakshanasakyâpekshakatvâd anirmokshas tasmân nimittaparihârasya duranushthânatvân na saktivâde muktir iti. Ân. Gi.
Saktasakyâsrayâ saktih svasattayâvasyam sakyam âkshipati. Bhâ.
55:1 I.e. being only incidental remarks about matters established or taught elsewhere.
57:1 According to the sruti: mahad yaksham prathamagam veda yo ha vai gyeshtham ka sreshtham ka veda.
57:2 Wood, for instance, is an 'agent' in regard of the function of burning, while it is a mere instrument with reference to the action of cooking.
