53. (Should it be said that distinction of pleasure, pain, &c., results) from (difference of) place; we say no, on account of the (Self's) being within (all things).
Here it might be objected that, although all Selfs are all-pervading, yet their conjunction with the internal organ which is seated in the body must take place in that part of each Self which is limited by the body; and that thus there may result from difference of locality a limitative distinction of resolutions, &c., of the adrishta, and of pleasure and pain.--This also, we reply, is not possible 'on account of the being within.' For, as being equally infinite, all Selfs are within all bodies. Thus the Vaiseshikas have no right whatever to assume any part of the Self to be limited by the body. And if they do assume such a part of the Self which in reality is without any parts, that part because merely assumptive will be incapable of limiting a real effect. Moreover, it is impossible to limit the body which originates in proximity to all (omnipresent) Selfs to one particular Self to the exclusion of all others. Moreover, on the doctrine of limitation due
72:1 And this is an attack on the basis of the position of the Sâṅkhyas as well as of the Vaiseshikas. 72:2 Which being equally omnipresent would all occupy the same space. 72:3 Many attributes such as colour, smell, touch, &c. reside in one place as belonging to one material object.
