2. (If it be said that the vidyâs are separate) on account of the difference (of secondary matters), we deny that, since even in one and the same vidyâ (different secondary matters may find place).
In spite of the preceding argumentation we cannot admit that the different cognitions of Brahman are equally intimated by all Vedânta-texts, because we meet with differences in secondary matters (guna). Thus the Vâgasaneyins mention in their text of the knowledge of the five fires a sixth fire ('And then the fire is indeed fire,' Bri. Up. VI, 2, 14), while the Khandogas mention no sixth fire but conclude their text of the pañkâgnividyâ with the express mention of five fires ('But he who thus knows the five fires,' Kh. Up. V, 10, 10).
Now it is impossible to admit that the cognition of those who admit that particular qualification (i.e. the sixth fire) and of those who do not should be one and the same. Nor may we attempt to evade the difficulty by saying that the sixth fire may be tacitly included in the vidyâ of the Khandogas; for that would contradict the number 'five' expressly stated by them.--In the colloquy of the prânas
188:1 Viz. the real fire in which the dead body is burned and which is known from perception.
189:1 I.e. the Khândogya-text contains no injunction that five fires only are to be meditated upon.
189:2 So that there stands nothing in the way of our amplifying our meditation by the addition of a sixth fire.
