The Vedanta Sutras of Badarayana: Third Adhyâya. Fourth Pâda.: III, 4, 2

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2. On account of (the Self) standing in a supplementary relation (to action), (the statements as to

1. The case is analogous to that of other textual statements as to the fruits of certain materials, samskâras and works; which statements have likewise to be understood as arthavâdas. Cp. the passage, 'He whose sacrificial ladle is made of parna-wood hears no evil sound;' 'By anointing his eye he wards off the eye of the enemy;' 'By making the prayâga and anuyâga-oblations he makes an armour for the sacrifice, an armour for the sacrificer so that he overcomes his enemies 2.'--But how can it be supposed that

1. But this we deny because in the present case 'sentence' has no force to teach the application (of the knowledge of the Self to the sacrifices, as a subordinate member of the latter). Things which the text states under no particular heading may indeed be connected with the sacrifice on the ground of 'sentence,' through some intermediate link which is not of too wide an application 2; but the agent is an intermediate link of too wide an application, since it is common to all action whether worldly or based on. the Veda. The agent cannot therefore be used as a mediating link to establish the connexion of the knowledge of the Self with the sacrifice.--Your objection is not valid, the pûrvapakshin replies, since the knowledge of a Self different from the body is of no use anywhere but in works based on the Veda. For such knowledge is of no use in worldly works, in all of which the activity may be shown to be guided by visible purposes; with reference to Vedic works, on the other hand, whose fruits manifest themselves only after the death of this body no activity would be possible

Footnotes

286:1 The contention of the pûrvapakshin--Gaimini--is that the knowledge of the Self has no independent fruit of its own, because it stands in a subordinate relation to sacrificial action. This relation is mediated by the Self--the object of knowledge--which is the agent in all action, and therefore itself stands in a subordinate relation to action. By learning that his Self will outlive the body the agent becomes qualified for actions, the fruit of which will only appear after death. The qualification the Self thus acquires is analogous to that which the rice-grains acquire by being sprinkled with water; for only through this latter act of ceremonial modification (or purification, samskâra) they become fit to be used in the sacrifice.--As the knowledge of the Self thus has no independent position, it cannot have an independent fruit of its own, and consequently the passages which state such fruits cannot be taken as 'injunctions of fruits,' but merely as arthavâdas, making some additional statement about the fruit of the sacrificial actions to which the knowledge of the Self is auxiliary.

286:2 The material, i.e. the ladle made of parna-wood, is auxiliary to the sacrifice, and the fruit which the text ascribes to it (viz. hearing no evil sound) therefore has to be viewed as a fruit of 287:1 The entire Veda constituting an extended syntactical whole, in which the agent is the same.

287:2 Thus the quality of being made of parna-wood is connected with the sacrifices on the ground of the vâkya implied in 'yasya parnamayî guhûr bhavati,' because here we have as an intermediate link the guhû, i.e. a special implement which is used at sacrifices only, and therefore is not of too wide an application.